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Abstract 
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency 
and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-
binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders 
decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple 
theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because 
Responders should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our 
experiment reveals that some individuals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict. 
Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely 
to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in 
three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger 
offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) Proposers whose offers do 
not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with 
earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher 
conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games 
in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare; thus, our 
findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis 
suggests that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the 
willingness of Responders to accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make 
persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are disappointed by a Responder’s decision to 
accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate. 
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Introduction 
 
When you reap the harvest of your land, do not reap to the very edges of your 
field or gather the gleanings of your harvest. Do not go over your vineyard a 
second time or pick up the grapes that have fallen. Leave them for the poor and 
the alien. (Leviticus 19:9-10) 
 
The God of the Old Testament instructed his followers to leave some of the fruits of their 
harvest in their fields, un-harvested. An economist might assume merely that God understood the 
Law of Diminishing Returns and taught his followers accordingly. But to ignore the exhortation 
to leave something behind for the poor and alien is to miss a potentially rich historical and 
economic point. Why, beyond the diminishing returns to labor, might one want to leave unpicked 
fruit on a vine? 
The property rights to the goods are clearly delineated in this story. No indication is given 
that the people for whom the gleanings are to be left have any claim to the harvest through the 
application of their labor or capital to the production process. Furthermore, that one indirect 
object of the exhortation is “the alien” (that is, foreigners and persons unknown) rules out the 
folk theorem and the shadow of the future as explanations. One way to reconcile these issues, 
then, is to postulate altruistic intentions or social preferences. However, this explanation ignores 
a few historical facts which, taken together, suggest an altogether different interpretation. 
During the historical era in which this text was written, the world of the Jewish people 
was in upheaval. Ravaged by war, famine, and forced migrations in the previous century, the 
people had begun to resettle, but for each family that settled a piece of land, there was another 
traveling in search of a place of its own.
1
 The poor wanderer who hungrily stumbled upon a 
thriving farm would have been tempted to steal from the farm for sustenance. Violence to one’s 
property likely would have been met with violence, and costly conflict ensued. In this context, 
the idea of leaving unpicked fruit for “the poor and alien” begins to look more strategic and less 
                                                 
1
 Whether one accepts the timeline laid out in the text of the Old Testament itself (Genesis 12:4-9, 26:12-22; Exodus 
14:5-9; Joshua 13:1-32) or one follows the standard view of Biblical historians who argue that Leviticus was first 
put to paper in the wake of the Babylonian Captivity c. 500 BCE (Warington, 1873; Harris, 1985), this narrative can 
be demonstrated to reflect the experience of the Jewish people. 
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altruistic. The leftover goods take on the characteristics of a side-payment, offered by the farmer 
to ward off predation.
2
 
In societies without strong institutional structures, the prospect of resource conflict is 
similarly ubiquitous. To reduce the risk of conflict, groups often uphold informal norms of 
reciprocal gift-giving, tolerated theft, and sharing (see e.g., Gurven, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005; 
Schechter, 2007). However, any (implicit or explicit) promises to avoid conflict made in the 
context of an informal norm are unenforceable. Thus, when one party offers resources to another 
in order to deter predation, there is always the risk that the payment is accepted and then conflict 
occurs anyway. A similar dynamic is at play in international politics. For example, aid may be 
offered to some nations under the condition that the leaders from aid-receiving nations adopt 
certain policies, but since such promises are unenforceable, a nation may accept aid and 
nevertheless fail to change policy (Kanbur, 2006; Temple, 2010). In the context of the Cold War, 
many aid payments were explicitly made with the goal of avoiding conflict – aid was offered to 
prevent nations from joining “the other side”. Such aid was clearly not always effective. 
Because of the incentive problems discussed above, most models of conflict resolution 
rely on the ability of parties to commit to a plan of action. For example, if contracts are 
enforceable, then binding, strategy-contingent transfer payments are sufficient to obviate costly 
conflicts in both theory and practice (Anbarci et al., 2002; Muthoo, 2004; Garfinkel & 
Skaperdas, 2007; Esteban & Sakovics, 2008; Kimbrough & Sheremeta, 2013).
3
 Nevertheless, in 
many conflicts, parties often incur large costs despite the possibility of Pareto improving 
resolutions. Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are prone to reject Pareto improving 
settlements when the proposed outcome is perceived as unfavorable (or unfair)
4
 and some 
individuals may simply enjoy fighting (or winning)
5
. On the other hand, there is some evidence 
that even in the absence of enforceable contracts, individuals can achieve Pareto improvements 
by employing conventions, reputation-based mechanisms, reciprocity, and cheap talk, 
particularly in the context of the informal norms mentioned above.
6
 However, it is unclear under 
                                                 
2
 Jones (1994) offers a similar argument for the emergence of human food sharing in general. 
3
 For a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature see Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) and for the 
experimental literature see Dechenaux et al. (2012). 
4
 See Hoffman & Spitzer (1985), Guth & Tietz (1990) and Henrich et al. (2001) for experimental evidence.  
5
 Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) find that subjects expend resources seeking a prize worth nothing. 
6
 Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) and Maynard Smith (1982) first demonstrated that employing conventions is an 
evolutionarily stable strategy in Hawk-Dove games. Similar conventions can emerge to solve numerous other 
coordination problems (Young, 1993; Sugden, 2005). Hafer (2006) shows that in a repeated conflict over a resource 
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what circumstances non-binding mechanisms can be employed to avert conflict. Our research is 
designed to help resolve this question in a controlled laboratory setting that captures many of the 
important features of conflicts outside the lab while facilitating causal inference. In that light, we 
view laboratory studies as an important complement to field studies (Imai et al., 2011). 
Our experiment is built on a two-stage conflict game with side-payment offers 
(Kimbrough & Sheremeta, 2013). In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide 
whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict over a valuable resource. 
Specifically, the game consists of two stages. In the bargaining stage, the Proposer offers a side-
payment to the Responder in an attempt to keep the resource and to avoid participation in a 
lottery contest in the conflict stage. After receiving the offer from the Proposer, the Responder 
decides whether to accept the offer and also whether to enter the conflict. Hence, the Responder 
may accept the offer and nevertheless enter the conflict. If the Responder accepts the offer, the 
Responder’s payoff increases by the amount of the offer and the Proposer’s payoff decreases by 
the same amount. However, if the Responder rejects the offer (or accepts the offer and still enters 
the conflict), both players advance to the conflict stage, in which they compete for the resource 
in a lottery contest. Since the side-payment contract is not enforceable, the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium is for the Proposer to make a zero side-payment offer and for the Responder to 
accept any offer and enter the conflict anyway. 
Previous experimental evidence from Kimbrough & Sheremeta (2013) indicates that 
some Proposers make large offers and some Responders accept those offers and choose not to 
enter conflict, even in anonymous, one-shot interactions. This suggests a potentially valuable 
role for non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms; and our paper is motivated by the 
observation that the likelihood of conflict resolution may be even higher if entitlements (or 
property rights) to the resource are clearly assigned ex ante. Thus, we employ two treatments to 
explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in the 
simple conflict game described above. In the Random treatment, we model a situation in which 
one party has come to possess a valuable resource by chance, and in the Earned treatment, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
with incomplete information, possession is a signal of success in previous conflicts and can establish expectations 
among potential contestants that support equilibria in which no conflict occurs. Muthoo (2004) shows how transfers 
can reduce conflict in repeated games of production and appropriation. Tingley & Walter (2011) show how cheap 
talk deterrence efforts impact conflict rates in an entry game. 
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model a situation closer to that described in the biblical passage above in which one party has 
earned the resource. 
It is well documented in experimental literature that property rights (entitlements) 
significantly affect behavior in ultimatum, dictator, and team production bargaining games 
(Hoffman et al., 1994, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; Gachter & Riedl, 
2005), and there is also anthropological evidence that people treat windfall gains differently than 
hard-earned gains; see e.g., Henrich et al. (2005) and associated commentary. In general, 
inducing a property right leads to more self-regarding behavior on the behalf of the right-holder 
and more acceptance of such behavior by others without rights. To see how a perceived property 
right could impact bargaining in a two-stage conflict game, suppose that a contested resource is 
first discovered by one individual, call him the resident (i.e., the Proposer), and only later 
contested by another, the contestant (i.e., the Responder). If the contestant believes that the 
resident has a property right to the resource, then she may be more likely to accept a contractual 
resolution, and knowing this, the resident may be more willing to offer a side-payment.
7
 This is 
the effect that has been observed in previous work on entitlements in bargaining games, but our 
design introduces a second dimension on which property rights may have an impact. 
Specifically, previous experiments have employed exogenous disagreement payoffs, but in the 
conflict game, rent dissipation is endogenous, and thus the impact of earned entitlements may 
also be observed in conflict expenditures. For example, if first possession creates an endowment 
effect in the resident, say, by reference to some social convention (finders keepers), then all else 
equal, the resident may be willing to fight harder than the contestant for the resource.
8
  
While the examples that we considered so far emphasize the impact of entitlements on 
interpersonal conflict, it should be clear that the underlying ideas are applicable to any level of 
organization. For example, Butler & Gates (2012) model conflict over rangeland in Africa and 
show how asymmetric entitlements can actually lead to conflict if one side is persistently 
disadvantaged.
9
 More generally, territorial disputes between nations have many of the same 
                                                 
7
 Empirical studies of animal territoriality frequently identify a ‘residency effect’; that is, first possessors 
disproportionately win resource contests (Haley, 1994; Alcock & Bailey, 1997; Kemp & Wiklund, 2004), and a 
recent experiment by DeScioli and Wilson (2011) documents the residency effect in human subjects.  
8
 Gintis (2007) exploits the logic of Parker’s (1974) “fighting assessment” to show how such a tendency could 
describe the origin of property rights in wars of attrition:  if the contestant knows that the resident will be willing to 
expend more effort on defense than she will on offense, then she should respond by choosing not to fight.  
9
 The intuition is similar to that in Grafen (1987), who shows that when one side is persistently in disadvantageous 
position, “desperado” behavior may be optimal. 
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features as those between individuals and smaller groups, and perceptions about who is entitled 
to a particular area may shape the nature and likelihood of conflict. The results of our experiment 
show that this is exactly the case. 
We find that when subjects earn their rights to be either Proposer or Responder, conflicts 
are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned rights impact 
behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make 
larger offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) Proposers whose 
offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully and exhibit greater conflict 
expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency 
are offset by higher conflict intensity. 
Our findings are of interest both to field researchers and to those studying conflict and 
conflict resolution inside the lab. Outside the lab, conflicting perceptions of entitlement are often 
essential components of conflict (Gurven, 2004; Schechter, 2007), and our experiment provides 
clear casual evidence on how entitlements (earned versus randomly assigned) impact bargaining 
and conflict. Our finding that the conflict avoidance benefits of earned rights are offset by 
increased conflict intensity is of particular interest to researchers studying conflict and conflict 
resolution in the laboratory (Linster et al., 2001; Arce et al., 2011; Tingley, 2011; Deck & 
Sheremeta, 2012; Dechenaux et al., 2012). Most previous studies of earned rights indicate that 
they are successful at reducing the costs of conflict – e.g. in ultimatum games, increased 
acceptance of offers is equivalent to reduced waste. Our results suggest that the impact of earned 
rights may not be so sanguine, as conditional on conflict occurring, earned rights increase its 
intensity. Our design allowed us to identify this effect by endogenizing the costs of conflict. In 
the discussion, we argue that the impact of earned rights operates largely by changing the beliefs 
of participants, and suggest directions for future research. 
  
Experimental environment, design, predictions and procedures 
Experimental environment and model predictions 
Our experiment examines a two-player conflict game in which both players expend 
resources competing for an indivisible resource that each value at v = 60. The game is divided 
into two sequential stages: the bargaining stage and the conflict stage. In the bargaining stage, 
the Proposer offers a side-payment s between 0 and 60 to the Responder in an attempt to avoid 
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participation in a rent-seeking lottery contest in the conflict stage. After receiving the side-
payment offer s from the Proposer, the Responder decides whether to accept the offer and also 
whether to enter the conflict. Hence, the Responder may accept a side-payment s and 
nevertheless enter the conflict. If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter the 
conflict, the game ends with the Responder receiving a payoff of s and the Proposer receiving a 
payoff of v – s, and neither player enter the conflict stage. In such a case, the surplus split 
between the two players is Π = s + v – s = v = 60. However, if the Responder rejects the offer 
(or accepts the offer and still enters the conflict), both players advance to the conflict stage, in 
which, according to our instructions, the Responder “may attempt to take” the prize from the 
Proposer. 
In the conflict stage, the Proposer and the Responder partake in the rent-seeking lottery 
contest due to Tullock (1980) between two symmetric players (i.e., player 1 and player 2). Both 
players expend costly resources e1 and e2 to increase their probabilities of winning the prize. A 
player i‘s probability of winning is defined by a lottery contest success function, i.e., pi(e1, e2) = 
ei/(e1 + e2). The expected payoff for a risk-neutral player i is E(πi) = pi(e1, e2)v – ei. By 
differentiating E(πi) with respect to ei and solving the best response functions simultaneously, we 
obtain unique Nash equilibrium expenditure levels e1
*
 = e2
*
 = v/4 = 15. Given the equilibrium 
expenditures, the expected payoffs of both players are E(π1
*
) = E(π2
*
) = v/4 = 15. Hence, the 
equilibrium prediction for the Tullock contest, independent of the bargaining stage, is that both 
players will expend 15 and each will receive on average a payoff of 15. Given that the game 
proceeds to the conflict stage, the equilibrium surplus split between the two players is Π* = 
E(π1
*
) + E(π2
*
) = v/2 = 30. 
Going back to the bargaining stage, since the side-payment offer is non-binding, the 
Responder has a dominant strategy to always accept the side-payment s and to enter the conflict 
stage, where she earns an additional expected payoff of 15 (this is because the prize is indivisible 
and s is withdrawn from the Proposer’s initial endowment). Thus, knowing that the Responder 
cannot be dissuaded from conflict in the bargaining stage, the Proposer should never offer a side-
payment, i.e., s
*
 = 0, and the game should always reach the conflict stage. Hence, the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium is for the Proposer to offer a side-payment of zero and for the 
Responder to accept all the offers and always enter the conflict. 
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Experimental design 
Building on this environment, we employ a between-subjects experimental design to 
explore the impact of earned rights on the frequency and intensity of conflict. Our treatments 
vary whether a subject’s assignment to the role of Proposer is Earned or Random. In the Earned 
treatment, after reading the instructions, all subjects took a ten-question, general knowledge quiz. 
Subjects were ranked by the number of questions they answered correctly and ties were broken 
by how quickly the answers were submitted. The subjects knew that they would be assigned their 
roles on the basis of their performance on the quiz. They were also told that the top performers 
on the quiz had “earned the right to be Proposers” and that the bottom half were assigned to be 
Responders. While the instructions in all treatments indicated that Proposers had prior claims to 
the resource – recall the statement that Responders “may attempt to take” the resource from 
Proposers – in the Earned treatment we allocate these prior claims by relative performance on 
the quiz rather than randomly, as in the other treatments. The outline of the experimental design 
and theoretical predictions are shown in Table 1. 
 
The hypothesized effects of earned rights 
Note that the Earned treatment changes neither the structure of the game nor the expected 
payoffs relative to the Random treatment, so the theoretical predictions under the standard 
money-maximizing model do not change. Nevertheless, it has been well documented in 
experimental literature that when subjects earn their roles, their behavior changes (Hoffman et 
al., 1994, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; Gachter & Riedl, 2005). Based on 
previous findings, we suggest several hypotheses as to the impact of earned rights on the 
frequency and intensity of conflicts. 
In general, we argue that when subjects earn their roles and the initial allocation of 
resources clearly assigns first-mover rights to one individual, cooperation will be easier because 
subjects’ expectations will be aligned. Specifically, we expect that earned rights will decrease 
conflict entry by Responders because Responders will be more inclined to respect the rights of 
Proposers who make positive offers (Gachter & Riedl, 2005). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Earned rights decrease the rate of conflict entry by Responders, controlling for the 
amount offered. 
8 
 
 
The first hypothesis suggests that ceteris paribus, earned rights should decrease the 
frequency of conflicts and increase the probability of conflict resolution. We emphasize that this 
result should be stated conditionally on the offer amount, since as we discuss below, there are ex 
ante plausible arguments that earned rights will move offers in either direction. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that Responders’ respect the earned rights of Proposers, then an identical offer should 
be more likely to be accepted in the Earned than in the Random treatment. At the same time, 
earned rights may also lead to heavier fighting by Proposers because rebuffed attempts at 
cooperation can lead to retaliation. This can also be interpreted as earned rights producing an 
endowment effect (Gintis, 2007). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on conflict, earned rights increase conflict expenditures by Proposers. 
 
Thus, we hypothesize that earned rights will decrease the frequency of conflicts, 
conditional on offer amounts, and increase the probability of conflict resolution (Hypothesis 1). 
However, if and when conflict ensues, we expect Proposers to react spitefully because they will 
believe that their property right is being disrespected (Hypothesis 2). 
Finally, the expected effect of earned rights on offers is indeterminate because there are 
two potential effects. First, those subjects who would already seek to cooperate by making 
positive offers when rights are randomly assigned may decrease their offers if they believe they 
have earned the right to a larger share of the surplus (Hoffman et al., 1994). On the other hand, 
some Proposers who would not make positive offers if rights were randomly assigned may now 
choose to offer positive amounts because they believe that a sufficient offer will induce non-
entry, and this may increase offers on average.
10
 Since both of these interpretations are 
intuitively plausible and we have no ex ante criteria for distinguishing them, we do not state a 
formal hypothesis about the impact of earned rights on offers. We simply note that behavior 
would in either case be jointly determined by the influence of earned rights on the beliefs of 
participants. We return to this idea later when we discuss the prospects for future research on this 
topic. 
 
                                                 
10
 Since we employ a between-subjects design, we do not observe the impact of earned rights within-subject. 
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Procedures 
To test these hypotheses we ran three experimental sessions of each treatment with 12 
subjects per session. Each session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment in which subjects 
were randomly and anonymously re-matched in each period. Subjects were assigned the role of 
either Proposer or Responder (randomly in the Random treatment and earned through quiz 
competition in the Earned treatment), and they persisted in that role throughout. At the end of 
each experimental session, subjects completed a brief demographic survey. To reinforce the one-
shot incentives of the game, subjects knew beforehand that we would select five of the 30 
periods for payment using a bingo cage; subjects’ earnings from these five periods were added to 
or subtracted from a participation fee of $20. We converted endowments and earnings to USD at 
a rate of 30 = $1 and subjects were paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. Sessions 
lasted one hour each. 
Subjects were recruited at random from the undergraduate student body of Chapman 
University. Subjects sat at, and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and 
instructions were read aloud by the experimenter as subjects followed along on paper. Subjects 
received their earnings in cash privately at the end of each session. The average experimental 
earnings, including the $20 participation fee, were $22.6, ranging from a low of $16.0 to a high 
of $28.3. No subject participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a 
similar experimental environment. Instructions for the Earned treatment are included in the 
Appendix. Instructions for the other treatments and the quiz are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 
Results 
Comparisons to the theory 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for our treatments. Theory predicts a total surplus of 
30 in both the Random and Earned treatments (see Table 1). However, the data from the 
experiment indicate that in the Random and Earned treatments, the average surpluses of 20.3 and 
18.4 are significantly lower than the theoretical prediction of 30. 
 
Finding 1: Surplus in both treatments is smaller than predicted. 
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To support these conclusions we estimated simple panel regressions separately for each 
treatment, where the dependent variable is the surplus (payoff) and the independent variables are 
a constant and a period trend. The models included a random effects error structure, with the 
individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual 
subjects. The standard errors were clustered at the session level, to control for the fact that 
multiple subjects repeatedly interacted with each other in a given session. Based on Wald tests 
conducted on estimates of each model, we found that surplus in all treatments is significantly 
lower than predicted (p < 0.01). 
Furthermore, much of the predicted surplus is lost due to substantial overinvestment in 
conflict relative to the predictions (see Figures 1a and 1b). Additional panel regressions for each 
treatment where conflict expenditure is the dependent variable and the independent variables are 
a constant, a dummy variable indicating whether the subject was a Responder, and a period trend 
indicate that these differences are statistically significant. As before, we include a random effects 
error structure by subject to account for multiple observations, and we cluster standard errors by 
session. Wald tests confirm that expenditures are greater than the predicted value of 15 (p < 
0.01), and the coefficient on the Responder dummy is positive but insignificant for all 
treatments. 
However, the welfare losses due to over-dissipation are actually understated by the fact 
that some pairs in both the Random and Earned treatments are able to use side-payment offers to 
avoid conflict – with probabilities 0.16 and 0.23, respectively. Figures 2a and 2b display 
histograms of side-payment offers for each treatment, and we confirm that offers are also 
significantly larger than predicted by the theory with additional random-effects panel regressions 
for each treatment where the Proposer’s side-payment offer is the dependent variable and the 
independent variables are a constant and a period trend. We cluster standard errors by session, 
and Wald tests confirm that offers are greater than the predicted amount of 0 in both the Random 
and Earned treatments (p < 0.01). 
Overall, these results are consistent with the findings of other studies on contests and 
conflict resolution (for a review see Dechenaux et al., 2012). Specifically, the findings that 
subjects sometimes use non-binding side-payment offers to successfully resolve conflicts (16% 
in Random and 23% in Earned), replicate the findings of Kimbrough & Sheremeta (2013), who 
report a conflict resolution rate of 14%. The finding that subjects overinvest in conflict (modeled 
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as a lottery contest) replicates the findings of a large experimental literature on rent-seeking 
(Davis & Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Anderson & Stafford, 2003; Sheremeta, 2010a, 
2010b, 2011; Sheremeta & Zhang, 2010; Chowdhury et al., 2012; Mago, Samek & Sheremeta, 
2013; Mago, Sheremeta & Yates, 2013).  
These facts taken together indicate that our data replicate the patterns of deviation from 
the theory observed in other studies, so now we turn our focus to the hypothesized effects of 
earned rights. 
 
Earned rights 
First we examine whether the Earned treatment yields a significant increase in the 
probability of avoiding conflict. Recall, Hypothesis 1 states that earned rights should decrease 
entry by Responders and increase the probability of conflict resolution. Table 2 provides support 
for Hypothesis 1, indicating that conflict in the Earned treatment is resolved with significantly 
higher probability than in the Random treatment (probability of 0.23 versus 0.16), leading to 
44% increase in the conflict resolution rate in the Earned case. 
 
Finding 2: Earned rights increase the probability of conflict resolution because Proposers make 
persistent and significantly larger offers in the Earned treatment. 
 
Table 3 displays the probability of conflict resolution by treatment, conditional on the 
size of the side-payment offer. For offers in the intervals [0, 15], (15, 30], and (30, 60], the 
probability of avoiding conflict is increasing for both treatments, but the probability is 
consistently higher for the Earned treatment. This finding and a significant and negative effect of 
offer size on conflict probability are supported by regression analysis. 
Specifically, as reported in Table 4, we estimate a linear probability model where the 
dependent variable Enter is one or zero indicating whether the Responder chose to enter the 
conflict stage. Restricting attention to non-zero offers, we estimate the impact of earned rights on 
the probability of entry, controlling for a period trend, the amount of offer, and whether the offer 
was accepted. We include random effects to account for multiple observations on each subject, 
and we cluster standard errors by session. The effect of earned rights (Earned) on the probability 
12 
 
of conflict (Enter) is negative and weakly significant (p = 0.09), and the effect of offer size 
(Offer) is significant and negative (p < 0.01). 
However, this regression underestimates the treatment effect because offers are 
persistently higher in the Earned treatment. The mean offer in the Earned treatment is 15.8 while 
it is only 12.3 in the Random treatment (Table 2). Figures 2a and 2b, displaying histograms of 
bargaining stage offers in the Random and Earned treatments, indicate the increase in the 
observed frequency of offers around 30 in the Earned treatment. 
The effect of earned rights on offers is even more pronounced when we look at the 
change in the distribution of offers over time. Figure 3 displays time series of the mean offer in 
the Earned and Random treatments. In the first 10 periods, the mean offer of 18.7 in the Random 
treatment is marginally higher than the mean offer of 17.5 in the Earned treatment. However, by 
the final 10 periods, the mean offer in the Random treatment has fallen by 63% to 7.0, while the 
mean offer in the Earned treatment has fallen only by 9% to 16.0. 
Regression analysis, reported in Table 5, indicates a significant relative decline in offers 
in the Random treatment. We estimate a panel regression with a random effects error structure to 
account for multiple observations on each subject, and we cluster standard errors at the session 
level. The dependent variable Offer is the amount of the side-payment offer, and the independent 
variables are a constant, a period trend Period, an Earned treatment dummy variable, and a term 
Period×Earned capturing the interaction of the period trend and the Earned rights dummy. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant (p < 0.01) and the coefficient on 
period alone is negative and significant (p < 0.01). A Wald test cannot reject the linear 
hypothesis that the period trend Period and the Period×Earned interaction term sum to zero, 
which suggests that offers decline over time only in the Random treatment (p = 0.13). 
To understand the source of the treatment effect on offers, Figure 4 displays time series 
of offers for each Proposer. In both the Random and Earned treatments, many subjects make 
substantial offers in early periods, but in the Earned treatment, far fewer of those subjects 
eventually reduce their offers to 0. The bold outlined panels in Figure 4 show subjects who made 
cooperative offers in early periods and later reduced their offers. Eleven subjects in the Random 
treatment offered less than 5 (on average) over the final 10 periods, while only five subjects do 
the same in the Earned treatment. Hence, earned rights induce persistent attempts at cooperation, 
which translate into a 44% increase in the probability of conflict resolution. 
13 
 
Despite the surplus gains from attempted cooperation and the resulting increase in the 
probability of avoiding conflicts, our data indicate that earned rights had no significant effect on 
total welfare
11
, in particular due to a reduction in Proposer payoffs (see Table 2).
12
 What explains 
these apparently contradictory tendencies? Table 6 displays statistics on offers, rejections, and 
conflicts in each treatment. To understand the source of the decrease in Proposers’ payoffs, 
notice first that Proposers in the Earned treatment make non-zero offers 75% of the time versus 
only 70% in the Random treatment. Furthermore, Responders reject a slightly larger percentage 
of non-zero offers in the Random treatment, which allows Responders to retain more of the 
surplus. This partly explains the decrease in Proposers payoffs, but both effects are welfare 
neutral, given that side-payments merely transfer resources to the Responder. To understand why 
the Earned treatment does not generate an increase in total surplus, we analyze the conflict 
expenditures of each type in both treatments.  
 
Finding 3: There is no significant effect of earned rights on total surplus because the increase in 
the rate of conflict resolution is offset by higher conflict expenditures by those Proposers who 
find themselves in a conflict after their offer is accepted. 
 
According to Hypothesis 2, when conflict ensues, earned rights should increase contest 
expenditures by Proposers, thereby reducing surplus. Table 7 displays average conflict 
expenditure by treatment and subject type, depending on whether a positive offer was accepted 
or rejected. In the Random treatment, non-zero accepted offers lead Proposers to reduce their 
expenditures (either because the positive offer signals cooperative intentions or because they are 
cutting their losses), but in the Earned treatment, when Responders accept positive offers and 
still choose to enter the conflict, Proposers react spitefully, fighting just as hard as when their 
offers are rejected. 
These results receive statistical support (see Table 8) in additional random-effects panel 
regressions, estimated separately for Proposers and Responders and restricted to observations in 
                                                 
11
 We estimate simple panel regressions, with subject-specific random effects and standard errors clustered by 
session where the dependent variable is surplus and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend, and an 
Earned treatment dummy. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Earned treatment has no effect (p > 0.7). 
12
 We estimate additional random-effects panel regressions, with standard errors clustered by session, separately for 
Proposers and Responders. The dependent variable is individual payoff and the independent variables are a constant, 
a period trend, and an Earned treatment dummy. The effect of earned rights is negative and (weakly) significant 
only for Proposers in the Earned treatment (p = 0.06). 
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which Proposers made non-zero offers. The dependent variable Expenditure is conflict 
expenditure and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend Period, the side-
payment Offer, an Earned treatment dummy, a binary variable Accept indicating whether the 
offer was accepted, and an interaction term Earned×Accept of the treatment dummy and whether 
the offer was accepted. We cluster standard errors by session. For Proposers, the coefficient on 
Accept is significant and negative (p < 0.02), which indicates that Proposers in the Random 
treatment invest less when their offers are accepted. On the other hand, the coefficient on the 
interaction term Earned×Accept is significant and positive (p < 0.02), and a Wald test cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients sum to zero (p = 0.77). This indicates that in the 
Earned treatment Proposers fight by expending resources just as hard when their offer is 
accepted as when it is rejected, thus accounting for the diminished surplus. All other coefficients 
except the constant are insignificant (p > 0.5).
13
 In the estimated equation for Responders, all 
coefficients are insignificant (p > 0.15).  
 
Finding 4: Controlling for offer size, Proposers in the Earned treatment expend more resources 
in conflict when their offers are accepted than Proposers in the Random treatment. 
 
Taken together, this evidence explains why earned rights do not change the aggregate 
surplus, despite decreasing the probability of conflict. According to these findings, earned rights 
impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position 
persistently offer larger side-payments; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict; 
but (3) Earned Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully and 
spend just as much in conflict as when offers are rejected (Finding 3). Hence, with earned rights, 
the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by greater conflict intensity, 
resulting in unchanged surplus. 
 
Discussion 
Our experiment generates three novel stylized facts that leave us with three motivational 
puzzles. First, we would like to be able to explain why earned rights induce Proposers to make 
                                                 
13
 An alternative specification excluding the interaction term shows no effect of accepting the offer and instead gives 
a positive and weakly significant coefficient on the Earned treatment dummy (p = 0.09), which imperfectly captures 
the same effect. 
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persistent, out-of-equilibrium, large offers. Second, we want to understand why these offers are 
sometimes successful in eliminating conflict. Finally, we want to understand why conflict 
becomes more costly with earned entitlements.  
In the end, though our experiment makes clear the behavioral impact of earned rights in a 
conflict setting, the underlying motivational impacts of earned rights are complex. We would 
argue that whether earned rights encourage cooperation or conflict depends on how they alter the 
beliefs of participants – if earned rights are salient and induce the belief that their holder has 
legitimately acquired a property right, then they may reduce the likelihood of conflict, as indeed 
we observe. But if only one party adopts this belief, then the ensuing conflicts may be more 
intense, as we also observe. In the study reported here, the positive and negative effects actually 
balance out one another, so that there is no change in total social welfare.  
However, in our design, we do not directly observe or measure beliefs, so we cannot say 
with certainty that changes in beliefs are the source of observed changes in behavior. This is an 
important direction for future research. Perhaps an experiment that jointly elicits beliefs and 
actions in our setting would be able to identify the motivations of participants more directly. In 
particular such a design would be valuable for understanding the observed effect of earned rights 
on Proposer’s offers. As we noted in the hypotheses section, this effect could have gone in either 
direction. If Proposers believed (a) that they had earned the prize and (b) that Responders 
believed (a), then we might have expected offers to decline. Those readers familiar with the 
ultimatum game literature may find this intuition appealing, as it is consistent with evidence 
there that earned rights increase the selfishness of Proposers. Instead, we observe persistent 
higher offers among these Proposers, suggesting perhaps that they were attempting to persuade 
Responders to adopt their beliefs. In this sense, offers can be viewed as a kind of “expensive 
talk”14 meant to convey information about the Proposer’s beliefs; indeed, why would a Proposer 
make a positive offer if he believed that no such offer could ever preclude conflict? When 
coupled with the fact that we observe higher conflict expenditures, conditional on entry, this 
interpretation seems plausible, as it seems that slighted Proposers react spitefully to entry by 
Responders. We hope that these issues will provide fruitful directions for future research. 
  
                                                 
14
 In contrast to “cheap talk”. 
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Conclusion 
In many contexts, individuals and groups attempt to employ non-binding mechanisms to 
resolve costly conflicts. As our biblical example suggests, the threat of resource conflict has 
motivated attempts to implement such mechanisms, despite issues of enforceability, far into 
recorded history, and recent research suggests that similar mechanisms are at work in both small 
and large scales even today (e.g., Gurven, 2004; Kanbur, 2006; Schechter, 2007; Temple, 2010). 
However, the lack of naturally occurring data prevents us from answering exactly how non-
binding mechanisms resolve conflicts. Controlled laboratory experiments offer a useful 
methodology for studying conflict and conflict resolution (Arce et al., 2011; Imai et al., 2011; 
Dechenaux et al., 2012). Here, we use an experiment to explore how the effectiveness of non-
binding conflict resolution mechanisms depends on earned entitlements. In particular, we 
examine how earned rights to a valuable resource impact the following variables: (1) the 
willingness to offer payments intended to obviate resource conflict, (2) the willingness to accept 
such payments and voluntarily forgo conflict, and (3) the costs of conflicts that result from failed 
attempts at cooperation. 
Previous literature documents that earned entitlements frequently increase the extent to 
which behavior approximates Nash play in bargaining games. When subjects observe that a 
decision maker has earned the right to an assigned role (e.g., the Proposer), the decision maker 
often behaves more selfishly and others are more likely to accept decisions that favor the right-
holder (e.g., by accepting lower offers in ultimatum games, see Hoffman et al., 1994). However, 
in these papers, the disagreement payoff is exogenous and subjects whose offers are rejected 
have no opportunity to impact the payoffs of their counterpart after bargaining. Here we 
endogenize the disagreement payoff in the conflict stage, which allows us to identify both the 
gains from bargained conflict resolution and the costs of conflict escalation after bargaining fails.  
We find that when Proposers earn the right to make side-payment offers, it creates a 
sense of entitlement to a share of the prize. Proposers respond by offering more and persisting in 
making high offers over time. These offers increase the rate of conflict resolution, but this does 
not improve welfare. When Proposers who earned their role observe their counterparts accepting 
transfer payments and nevertheless choosing to enter the conflict, they increase the intensity of 
conflict, offsetting the gains from higher conflict avoidance.  
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Thus, while it would appear that there is some role for non-binding mechanisms to reduce 
the frequency of conflict, it is important to recognize that the effectiveness of such mechanisms 
is influenced in two countervailing ways by the presence of earned entitlements. In particular, 
our method of endogenizing the costs of conflict revealed a negative impact of entitlements that 
had not been measured in previous research. In any application, the relative magnitudes of the 
observed effects are likely to depend on both the perceived strength of the entitlements and the 
costs and benefits of conflict, and for all these reasons, we would urge caution in extrapolating 
from the success of earned entitlements in encouraging cooperation in previous work. 
 
Replication data 
All analyses were conducted using Stata 12 and R (R Core Team 2013). The dataset, 
replication Stata and R files and an output log for the empirical analysis can be found at 
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. 
 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank the Associate Editor at the Journal of Peace Research and three 
anonymous referees for thoughtful and constructive comments. We also thank Bart Wilson for 
insightful comments and the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University for generous 
financial support. 
 
 
  
18 
 
References 
Alcock, John & Winston J Bailey (1997) Success in territorial defence by male tarantula hawk 
wasps Hemipepsis ustulata: The role of residency. Ecological Entomology 22(4): 377-
383. 
Anbarci, Nejat; Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos (2002) Comparing bargaining 
solutions in the shadow of conflict: How norms against threats can have real effects. 
Journal of Economic Theory 106(1): 1-16. 
Arce, Daniel G; Rachel T Croson & Catherine C Eckel (2011) Terrorism experiments. Journal of 
Peace Research 48(3): 373-382. 
Butler, Christopher K & Scott Gates (2012) African range wars: Climate, conflict and property 
rights. Journal of Peace Research 49(1): 23-34. 
Cherry, Todd L; Peter Frykblom & Jason F Shogren (2002) Hardnose the dictator. American 
Economic Review 92(4): 1218-1221. 
Chowdhury, Subashish M; Roman M Sheremeta & Theodore L Turocy (2012) Overbidding and 
overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. ESI 
Working Paper, Chapman University. 
Davis, Douglas D & Robert J Reilly (1998) Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An 
experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer. Public Choice 
95(1-2): 89-115. 
Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Dan Kovenock & Roman M Sheremeta (2012) A survey of 
experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. ESI Working Paper, 
Chapman University (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154022). 
Deck, Cary & Roman M Sheremeta (2012) Fight or flight? Defending against sequential attacks 
in the game of Siege. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6): 1069-1088. 
DeScioli, Peter & Bart J Wilson (2011) The territorial foundations of human property. Evolution 
and Human Behavior 32(5): 297-304. 
Esteban, Joan M & Josef Sakovics (2008) A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The 
genesis of bargaining power. Theory and Decision 65(3): 227-252. 
Gachter, Simon & Arno Riedl (2005) Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible claims. 
Management Science 51(2): 249-263. 
Garfinkel, Michelle R & Stergios Skaperdas (2000) Conflict without misperceptions or 
incomplete information: How the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(5): 
793-807. 
Garfinkel, Michelle R & Stergios Skaperdas (2007) Economics of conflict: An overview. In: 
Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley (eds) Handbook of Defense Economics. New York: 
Elsevier, 649–710.  
Garfinkel, Michelle R & Stergios Skaperdas (2012) Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace 
and Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gintis, Herbert (2007) The evolution of private property. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 64(1): 1-16. 
Grafen, Alan (1987) The logic of divisively asymmetric contests: Respect for ownership and the 
desperado effect. Animal Behaviour 35(2): 462-467. 
Gurven, Michael (2004) To give or not to give: The behavioral ecology of human food transfers. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27(4): 543-583. 
Hafer, Catherine (2006) On the origins of property rights: Conflict and production in the state of 
nature. Review of Economic Studies 73(1): 119-143. 
19 
 
Haley, Michael P (1994) Resource-holding power asymmetries, the prior residence effect and 
reproductive payoffs in male northern elephant seal fights. Behavioral Ecology and 
Sociobiology 34(6): 427–434. 
Harris, Stephen L (1985) Understanding the Bible. Palo Alto: Mayfield. 
Henrich, Joseph; Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis & 
Richard McElreath (2001) In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 
small-scale societies. American Economic Review 91(2): 73-78. 
Henrich, Joseph; Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, 
Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith 
Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W Marlowe, John Q 
Patton, & David Tracer (2005) ‘Economic man’ in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral 
experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(6): 795-815. 
Hoffman, Elizabeth & Matthew Spitzer (1985) Entitlements, rights, and fairness: An 
experimental examination of subjects’ concepts of distributive justice. Journal of Legal 
Studies 14(2): 254-297. 
Hoffman, Elizabeth; Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat & Vernon L Smith (1994) Preferences, 
property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior 
7(3): 346–380. 
Hoffman, Elizabeth; Kevin A McCabe & Vernon L Smith (1998) Behavioral foundations of 
reciprocity: Experimental economics and evolutionary psychology. Economic Inquiry 
36(3): 335-52. 
Imai, Kosuke; Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley & Teppei Yamamoto (2011) Unpacking the black 
box of causality: Learning about causal mechanisms from experimental and observational 
studies. American Political Science Review 105(4): 765-789. 
Jones, NG Blurton (1984) A selfish origin for human food sharing: Tolerated theft. Ethology and 
Sociobiology 5(1): 1-3. 
Kanbur, Ravi (2006) The economics of international aid. In: Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean 
Mercier Ythier (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, 
Volume 2: Applications. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1559–1588. 
Kemp, Darrell J & Christer Wiklund (2004) Residency effects in animal contests. Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of London B 271(1549): 1707-1711. 
Kimbrough, Erik O & Roman M Sheremeta (2013) Side-payments and the costs of conflict. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 31(3): 278-286. 
Konrad, Kai A (2009) Strategy and Dynamics in Contests. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Linster, Bruce G; Richard L Fullerton, Michael Mckee & Stephen Slate (2001) Rent-seeking 
models of international competition: An experimental investigation. Defence and Peace 
Economics 12(4): 285-302. 
Mago, Shakun D; Anya Savikhin Samek & Roman M Sheremeta (2013) Facing your opponents: 
Social identification and information feedback in contests. ESI Working Paper, Chapman 
University (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2080409). 
Mago, Shakun D; Roman M Sheremeta & Andrew Yates (2013) Best-of-three contest 
experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 31(3): 287-296. 
Maynard Smith, John (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
20 
 
Maynard Smith, John & GA Parker (1976) The logic of asymmetric contests. Animal Behaviour 
24(1): 159–175. 
Muthoo, Abhinay (2004) A model of the origins of basic property rights. Games and Economic 
Behavior 49(2): 288-312. 
Oxoby, Robert J & John Spraggon (2008) Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65(3-4): 703-713. 
Parker, GA (1974) Assessment strategy and the evolution of fighting behavior. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology 47(1): 223-243. 
Potters, Jan C; Casper G de Vries & Frans Van Linden (1998) An experimental examination of 
rational rent seeking. European Journal of Political Economy 14(4): 783-800. 
R Core Team (2013) R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria (http://www.R-project.org/). 
Schechter, Laura (2007) Theft, gift-giving, and trustworthiness: Honesty is its own reward in 
rural Paraguay. American Economic Review 97(5): 1560-1582. 
Sheremeta, Roman M (2010a) Expenditures and information disclosure in two-stage political 
contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(5): 771-798. 
Sheremeta, Roman M (2010b) Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests. 
Games and Economic Behavior 68(2): 731-747. 
Sheremeta, Roman M (2011) Contest design: An experimental investigation. Economic Inquiry 
49(2): 573-590. 
Sheremeta, Roman M & JingJing Zhang (2010) Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in 
contests? Social Choice and Welfare 35(2): 175-197. 
Sugden, Robert (2005) The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Temple, Jonathan RW (2010) Aid and conditionality. In: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (eds) 
Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 4415–4523. 
Tingley, Dustin (2011) The dark side of the future: An experimental test of commitment 
problems in bargaining. International Studies Quarterly 55(2): 521-544. 
Tingley, Dustin H & Barbara F Walter (2011) Can cheap talk deter? An experimental analysis. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(6): 996-1020. 
Warington, George (1873) When Was the Pentateuch Written? New York: Pott, Young & Co. 
Young, H Peyton (1993) The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61(1): 57-84. 
 
 
Erik O Kimbrough, b. 1984, PhD in Computational Sciences and Informatics (George 
Mason University, 2010); Assistant Professor of Economics (Maastricht University, 2010-2011); 
Assistant Professor of Economics (Simon Fraser University, 2011- ). 
 
Roman M Sheremeta, b. 1982, PhD in Economics (Purdue University, 2009); Assistant 
Professor of Economics (Chapman University, 2009-2013); Associate Professor of Economics 
(Chapman University, 2013-2014); Assistant Professor of Economics (Case Western Reserve 
University, 2013- ).  
21 
 
Table 1: Experimental design and theoretical predictions 
  Treatment 
 Player Random Earned 
Side-payment offer, s
* 
Proposer 0 0 
Probability of conflict resolution Responder 0.00 0.00 
Equilibrium expenditure, e
* Proposer 15 15 
Responder 15 15 
Expected payoff, E(*) 
Proposer 15 15 
Responder 15 15 
Available surplus, v  60 60 
Equilibrium surplus, *  30 30 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average summary statistics by treatment 
  Treatment 
 Player Random Earned 
Side-payment offer, s
 
Proposer 12.3 (13.2)* 15.8 (14.1)* 
Probability of conflict resolution Responder 0.16* 0.23* 
Average expenditure, e
 Proposer 23.3 (12.7)* 26.9 (10.9)* 
Responder 23.9 (12.8)* 27.3 (12.3)* 
Average payoff,  
Proposer 5.1 (33.1)* 1.9 (34.1)* 
Responder 15.2 (30.1) 16.5 (29.2) 
Total surplus,    20.6* 18.4* 
Standard deviations in parentheses. * Indicates that the data are statistically significantly 
different from the equilibrium of the model with p < 0.01 (Wald tests based on estimates 
computed separately for each treatment and each variable of interest with subject- or pair-
specific random effects and standard errors clustered at the session level). 
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Table 3: Probability of conflict resolution conditional on the side-payment offer 
 Treatment 
Offer Random Earned 
0 ≤ s ≤ 15 0.09 0.06 
15 < s ≤ 30 0.24 0.36 
30 < s ≤ 60 0.48 0.64 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Linear probability estimates of conflict entry, non-zero offers 
 Enter 
Offer -0.014** 
 (0.003) 
Earned -0.052† 
 (0.031) 
Accept -0.012 
 (0.092) 
Period -0.003* 
 (0.001) 
Constant 1.103** 
 (0.082) 
Observations 781 
R Sq. 0.169 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Estimates of proposer’s offers 
 Offer 
Period -0.495** 
 (0.089) 
Earned -2.589 
 (4.065) 
Period×Earned 0.391** 
 (0.113) 
Constant 19.974** 
 (1.195) 
Observations 1080 
R Sq. 0.0664 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Number of offers, rejections and conflicts 
 Treatment 
 Random Earned 
Total # of offers 540 540 
# of non-zero offers  
     (Prob = non-zero/total) 
377  
(0.70) 
404 
(0.75) 
# of rejections  
     (Prob = rejections/total) 
199 
(0.37) 
169 
(0.31) 
# of non-zero rejections 
     (Prob = rejections/non-zero) 
70 
(0.19) 
70 
(0.17) 
# of conflicts avoided 
     (Prob = avoided/total) 
89 
(0.16) 
125 
(0.23) 
Probabilities and conditional probabilities in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Mean non-zero offers and expenditures by treatment 
  Treatment 
  Random Earned 
Decision Player Offer > 0 Expenditure Offer > 0 Expenditure 
Accept 
Proposer 16.9 (12) 20.9 (12.4) 20.9 (11.4) 28.2 (11.6) 
Responder 16.9 (12) 22.7 (12.7) 20.9 (11.4) 27.4 (13.3) 
Reject 
Proposer 9.6 (9.7) 26.8 (11.4) 8.9 (8.5) 27.8 (9.9) 
Responder 9.6 (9.7) 26.8 (12.1) 8.9 (8.5) 28.6 (9.8) 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Estimates of conflict expenditures by type 
 Expenditure 
 Proposer Responder 
Offer -0.024 0.097 
 (0.090) (0.080) 
Earned 1.879 3.559 
 (3.107) (3.120) 
Period -0.078 -0.024 
 (0.155) (0.109) 
Accept -3.812* -1.626 
 (1.603) (1.144) 
Earned×Accept 4.213* -0.197 
 (1.771) (1.233) 
Constant 27.118** 24.339** 
 (1.525) (2.515) 
Observations 588 588 
R Sq. 0.0831 0.0397 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 1: Histograms of conflict expenditures by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Histograms of bargaining offers by treatment 
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Figure 3: Time series of mean offers by treatment with OLS fit 
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Note: Each row represents Proposers in 1 session (rows 1-3 Earned and rows 4-6 Random).  
Panels outlined in bold indicate subjects who offered less than 5 on average from period 21-30. 
 
Figure 4: Step plots of proposer’s offers by period and treatment 
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Appendix (for online publication only) – Instructions for the earned treatment 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you and the 11 other participants in this experiment can earn an appreciable amount of money, which will 
be paid to you in CASH at the end of today’s experiment.  
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _30_ 
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The 
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods 
for actual payment using a bingo cage. We will sum your total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a 
U.S. dollar payment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s decisions. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each period. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 1 
At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 2 
participants. Each randomly chosen pair will consist of one Proposer and one Responder.  
The positions of Proposer and Responder will be determined by your scores on a quiz before the first 
period of the experiment. Each of you will be asked the same set of 10 questions. Your quiz score is the number of 
questions you answered correctly. Quiz scores will be ranked from highest to lowest and ties are decided by giving a 
higher ranking to the person who finishes the quiz in the shortest amount of time.  
Once the complete rankings of participants are determined, you will enter your name, and the participants 
will be divided into two groups, the Proposers and the Responders. The lower ranking half will be Responders for all 
periods of the experiment. The higher-ranking half has earned the right to be Proposers. Your role will determine the 
decisions that you make. 
Once the roles have been assigned, an experimenter will direct you to another computer. The computer will 
display in the middle of the screen which role you have been assigned.  
The composition of your pair will be changed randomly every period.  Each period will consist of two 
stages. In Stage 1, you and the other participant in your group will bargain over a reward. The reward is worth 60 
francs to you and the other participant in your group. 
 
YOUR DECISION 
In each period, the Proposer will be endowed with the 60 franc reward and will have an opportunity to 
make an Offer to the Responder. The Proposer may offer any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An 
example of the Proposer’s decision screen is shown below. 
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Once the Proposer has entered an offer and submitted that offer to the Responder, the Responder will 
choose either to Accept or Reject the offer and also whether to enter Stage 2 or not. An example of the Responder’s 
decision screen is shown below. 
 
 
EARNINGS  
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a payment equal 
to the offer, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward minus the amount of the offer: 
Proposer Earnings  = 60 – Offer 
Responder Earnings  = Offer 
If the Responder rejects the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a payment equal 
to 0, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward: 
Proposer Earnings  = 60 
Responder Earnings  = 0 
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides to enter Stage 2, then the experiment moves to Stage 2 in 
which the Responder may attempt to take the reward. In that case, the Responder receives a payment equal to the 
earnings from Stage 2 plus the offer, and the Proposer receives the earnings from Stage 2 minus the offer: 
30 
 
Proposer Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 – Offer 
Responder Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 + Offer 
If the Responder rejects the offer, then the experiment moves to Stage 2 in which the Responder may 
attempt to take the reward. In that case, both participants will receive their earnings from decisions made in Stage 2:  
Proposer Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 
Responder Earnings  = Earnings in Stage 2 
Note, if the Responder decides not to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he accepts or rejects the offer) 
then the period ends after stage 1. However, if the Responder decides to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he 
accepts or rejects the offer) both participants will enter stage 2.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2 
DECISION IN STAGE 2 
In Stage 2, the Responder may attempt to take the reward from the Proposer. Each participant may bid for 
the 60 franc reward. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of your decision 
screen is shown below. 
 
 
EARNINGS IN STAGE 2 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of 
who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. Thus, your earnings in stage 2 will be calculated 
in the following way: 
 If you receive the reward:       
   Earnings in Stage 2 = 60 – Your Bid 
 If you do not receive the reward:      
   Earnings in Stage 2 = 0 – Your Bid 
Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 600 francs). Depending on a 
period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select 5 
out of 30 periods for actual payment. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. 
dollar payment. If the earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the earnings are 
positive, we will add them to your participation fee. 
 
What Does my Bid Mean? 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant in your 
group bids, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one 
lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 
you and the other participant in the group. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward worth 60 francs. Thus, 
31 
 
your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs 
you and the other participant in your group bids. 
 
If both participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants in the group. 
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. If participant 
1 bids 10 francs and participant 2 bids 20 francs, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 20 
lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 30 (10 + 20). As you can 
see, participant 2 has higher chance of receiving the reward: 0.67 = 20/30. Participant 2 has 0.33 = 10/30 chance of 
receiving the reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who 
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you 
received the reward or not. 
At the end of each period, the Proposer’s offer, whether the offer was accepted, whether the Responder 
entered Stage 2, your bid, the other participant’s, whether you received the reward or not, and the earnings for the 
period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record 
your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. An example of the 
outcome screen is shown below. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one other participant to form a two-person group. You can never 
guarantee yourself the reward. However, if you are the Proposer in stage 1, and the Responder decides not to enter 
stage 2, you will receive the reward. Furthermore, if the experiment proceeds to stage 2 then by increasing your bid 
in stage 2, you can increase your chance of receiving the reward. In stage 2, regardless of which participant receives 
the reward, all participants must pay their bids. 
Are there any questions? 
 
